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RETIREMENT INCENTIVES IN THE TWENTY FIRST
CENTURY: THE MOVE TOWARD EMPLOYER CONTROL OF
THE ADEA
Judith A McMorrow*
I. INTRODUCTION: RETIREMENT AND THE ADEA
Retirement has become an increasingly important topic of
public policy discussion in the United States,' as well as an
accepted, and even cherished, goal for many American work-
ers.2 Consequently, it is not surprising that the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act (ADEA) recognized, somewhat
inartfully, the importance of retirement. When originally
passed, the ADEA expressly provided an exemption for any
bona fide employee benefit plan such as a retirement, pension,
or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the pur-
poses of the ADEA.4 In 1986, Congress amended the ADEA to
eliminate mandatory retirement, but made clear in its legis-
lative history that voluntary retirement was a valid employee
choice.5 The interaction of retirement and the ADEA became
* Associate Professor, Boston College Law School. Thank you to the students on
the University of Richmond Law Review for their vision in developing this sympo-
sium, Howard Eglit and Michael Harper for sharing their ideas, and Jackie Gardina
for her excellent research assistance.
1. See, e.g., John M. Cornman & Eric R. Kingson, Trends, Issues, Perspectives,
and Values For the Aging of the Baby Boom Cohorts, 36 THE GERONTOLOGIST 15
(1996).
2. See WILLIAM GRAEBNER, A HISTORY OF RETIREENT: THE MEANING AND FUNC-
TION OF AN AMEICAN INSTITUTION 1885-1978, at 269-70 (1980).
3. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
4. See Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended 29 U.S.C. §
623(f)(2) (1994)). See Judith A. McMorrow, Retirement and Worker Choice: Incentives
to Retire and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 B.C. L. REV. 347, 350
(1988), for a history of this provision. The Older Worker Benefit Protection Act
(OWBPA), Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990), (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-626 (1990 & Supp. 1996)), amended the ADEA to distinguish between
seniority systems and bona fide employee benefit plans, and altered the subterfuge
language to make clear that Congress was disavowing restrictive Supreme Court
interpretations of "subterfuge." See S. REP. No. 101-263 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.AN. 1509, 1534-35.
5. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No.
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more explicit when Congress amended the Act again in 1990 to
allow employers to observe the terms of "a voluntary early
retirement plan consistent with" the purposes of the ADEA.!
The 1990 amendments also expressly allowed waivers as part of
retirement incentive plans. Consistent with this pattern of
amendments under the ADEA, courts similarly have been solici-
tous to the interests of both employers and employees in pro-
viding retirement incentives, arguably to the extent of mini-
mizing other goals of the ADEA such as promoting employ-
ment.'
While the ADEA clearly has a strong interest in the rela-
tionship between work and retirement, the ADEA is one small
part of a mosaic of government regulation that shapes our
nation's retirement policy. Social security, the nation's largest
retirement program, covers ninety percent of all workers Pri-
vate pensions have grown dramatically in recent years, with
almost half of the population now covered by private pen-
sions." Meanwhile, the government has taken a much more
active role in regulating these private pensions through the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)." Congress
has recognized that "pension benefits are special under federal
99-592, 100 Stat. 3342 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 622-624, 630-631) (stating that no
such plan shall require or permit the involuntary retirement of an individual because
of age); McMorrow, supra note 4, at 359-61.
6. See OWBPA, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-626 (1990 & Supp. 1996)). The express protection of voluntary
early retirement incentive plans is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2XB)(ii) (1994). See
also S. REP. No. 101-263, at 28-29 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.AN. 1509, 1534.
7. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (1994).
8. See, e.g., Michael C. Harper, Age-Based Exit Incentives, Coercion, and the Pro-
spective Waiver of ADEA Rights: The Failure of the Older Workers Benefit Protection
Act, 79 VA. L. REV. 1271, 1274 (1993); McMorrow, supra note 4, at 371-77.
9. See Murray Gendell & Jacob S. Siegel, Trends in Retirement Age By Sex,
1950-2005, MONTHLY LAB. REV., July 1992, at 22, 23.
10. See id.
11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
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law."'m Through its regulation of both governmental and pri-
vate programs, the federal government has undertaken a domi-
nant role in shaping retirement policy in the United States.'3
Compared with the scope of Social Security and ERISA regu-
lation, the ADEA is not a dominant vehicle for shaping federal
retirement policy. Its focus is more limited. The ADEA's express
goals are directed toward eliminating discrimination in employ-
ment, promoting the employment of older workers based on
ability, and helping employers and workers meet the problems
arising from the impact of age on employment.'4 The ADEA
was modeled after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,'"
and was promoted using the language of civil and individual
rights.'6 While acknowledging the civil rights origins of the
ADEA, we must not place the ADEA in too small a conceptual
box by ignoring its important complementary role in shaping
and reinforcing developments under Social Security and ERISA.
In particular, the ADEA helps to shape how employers exercise
the discretion given them under these other federal statutes.'7
The goal of this essay is to analyze whether the ADEA, as
currently structured, can achieve its non-discrimination goals
12. S. REP. NO. 101-263 at 22-23 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C-.AN. 1509,
1528 (emphasis omitted). The Senate Report identified some of the ways in which
federal law recognizes the special status of pensions. Unlike severance (or other bene-
fits), pensions are protected through statutory vesting provisions; they are guaranteed
by a federal insurance agency;, and they are administered by means of a federal sys-
tem of reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary obligations. Congress, through ERISA, has
expressed a commitment to regulate, protect, and underwrite the pension benefits of
American workers.
13. See GRAEBNER, supra note 2, at 267 (asserting that the federal government is
"the foremost arbiter of retirement").
14. See 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1994).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
16. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994) ("prohibit[ing] arbitrary age discrimination in
employment"); 136 CONG. REC. S13, 597 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990) (statement of man-
agers accompanying the OW3PA citing agreement "to protect the civil rights of mil-
lions of older Americans" and "to protect older workers"); Howard Eglit, The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act at Thirty: Where It's Been, Where It Is Today,
Where Its Going, 31 U. RIcH. L. REv. 579 (1997) (describing the origins of the
ADEA).
17. See, e.g., Houghton v. SIPCO, Inc., 38 F.3d 953, 959 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding
no ADEA liability for announcing retirement benefit reductions permissible under
ERISA, and no ADEA violation in offering older employees early retirement option
not available to younger employees).
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and also be an effective vehicle to complement retirement policy
in the twenty-first century. To that end, this essay will examine
two ideas. First, retirement incentives are likely to play an
increasingly popular role as employers attempt to regulate re-
tirement patterns among their workers."8 Any retirement plan
includes incentives, in the sense that the program is more at-
tractive when structured to give higher benefits. Retirement
incentives as used in this article refers to circumstances in
which employers provide additional benefits not included as a
regular and permanent part of a pension plan. 9 Retirement
incentives promise to become more popular because of both the
changing work and retirement patterns of American workers
and the increasingly limited opportunities for employers to
encourage retirement through traditional programs. Changes in
Social Security and private pensions leave employers with re-
tirement incentives as one of the few ways in which to encour-
age the exit of workers from the work force.
At the same time that employers are likely to find retirement
incentives increasingly attractive, the ADEA, as interpreted and
amended, is providing employers with increased control and
autonomy in how to structure those incentives. In particular,
the ADEA's affirmation of waivers in retirement incentives and
the trend toward arbitration of ADEA statutory employment
disputes both function to move retirement incentives into pri-
vate control of employers. This privatization has two public
policy consequences. Employees are deterred from bringing
arguably discriminatory conduct to the attention of the public
policy bodies such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC) and the courts, thereby diminishing the non-
discrimination goals of the ADEA. In addition, by allowing
employers to screen their actions from public scrutiny, the
ADEA becomes a less effective vehicle for complementing na-
tional retirement policy.
18. See Olivia S. Mitchell & Anna M. Rappaport, Innovations and Trends in Pen-
sion Plan Coverage, Type, and Design, in THE FUTURE OF PENSIONS IN THE UNrrED
STATES 53, 55 (Ray Schmitt ed., 1993) (using pensions for "regulating retirement
flows").
19. See Phyllis H. Mutschler, Early Retirement Incentive Programs (ERIPs): Mech-
anisms for Encouraging Early Retirement, in HANDBOOK ON EMPLOYMENT AND THE
ELDERLY 182, 183 (William H. Crown ed., 1996).
798 [Vol. 31:795
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II. CHANGES IN WORK AND RETIREMENT: ANTICIPATING
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Recent studies have demonstrated what we all may know
intuitively, but which only has recently been empirically demon-
strated: financial incentives, particularly those from Social Se-
curity and private pensions, influence work decisions
throughout our work life, and particularly in the decision of
when and how to exit the work force." To better understand
how those incentives affect the retirement decision, we need to
have a fuller understanding of retirement.
When Congress passed the ADEA in 1967, it operated under
a single model of retirement in which the significant majority of
workers went from full-time work to full-time retirement.2
This simple model of either full-time work or full-time retire-
ment, however, is not accurate for many older workers. We
have an increasing awareness of "new retirement" in which
workers engage in "productive aging."' This takes the form of
increasing numbers of workers continuing to work in some form
after ostensibly retiring. Some workers shift from career jobs to
full- or part-time post-career jobs.' These post-career "bridge"
jobs often involve fewer hours, greater flexibility and less
stress.' Others switch to related work. For example, a survey
of law professors who retired between 1983 and 1988 showed
that approximately seventeen percent continued full-time work
for compensation, and over half continued to work at least part-
time for compensation after retiring from their tenured faculty
positions.'s Their postretirement activities included teaching,
20. See JOSEPH F. QUINN ET AL., PASSING THE TORCH: THE INFLUENCE OF Eco-
NOMIC INCENTIVES ON WORK AND RETmMENT 234-38 (1990).
21. See id. at 240.
22. See, PRODUCTIVE AGING: ENHANCING VITALITY IN LATER LIFE (R. Butler & H.
Gleason eds., 1985); Laura Pappano, The New Retirement: Six Ways to Make the Most
of Life After Work, B. GLOBE MAG., Feb. 16, 1997, at 16..
23. See Christopher J. Ruhm, Historical Trends in the Employment and Labor
Force Participation of Older Americans, in HANDBOOK ON EMPLOYMENT AND THE EL-
DERLY 81, 98 (William H. Crown ed., 1996); John R Besl & Balkrishna D. Kale, Old-
er Workers in the 21st Century: Active and Educated, A Case Study, MONTHLY LAB.
REV., June 1996, at 18, 27.
24. See Ruhm, supra note 23, at 98.
25. See Judith A. McMorrow & Anthony R. Baldwin, Life After Law School: On
1997] 799
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consulting, arbitration, and practice." These findings are con-
sistent with other studies, which have demonstrated that from
one-third to one-half of men partially retire, with an average
continued-work-life of over five years." Although women have
been less studied, preliminary data indicates that substantial
numbers of women are also engaging in partial retirement.'
One study found that a quarter of workers engaged in "reverse
retirement" by reentering the work force at some point during
the eight years after initially retiring.' This pattern of engag-
ing in some form of work as a transition from full-time work to
full-time retirement means that many workers will continue to
supplement their income during this transition time. It makes
moving out of the full-time career job more affordable for many
workers, and provides a larger pool of part-time workers to
replace the retirees."0 This, in turn, may make retirement in-
centives more attractive to employers.
This pattern of transitional work is likely to become more
pronounced in the future. When Congress passed the ADEA,
the employment rates among older workers (primarily men) had
declined steadily over the preceding decades. 1 The impact of
these shifts is magnified as the U.S. population ages. Both
scholars and pop culture have followed the baby boomers into
middle age and anticipate their increasing numbers in retire-
ment. 2 These changes are more than academic. Politicians,
economists, pension planners, gerontologists, and the stock
market are all predicting how the aging of our population will
impact our economy, our political life, our culture, and our
Being a Retired Law Professor, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 407, 415-16 (1991).
26. See id. at 415.
27. See Ruhm, supra note 23, at 98.
28. See QUINN ET AL., supra note 20, at 26. Part-time work before retirement was
found to be more common for women than for men. See id.
29. See Ruhm, supra note 23, at 98.
30. But see Eglit, supra note 16, at 684-89 (discussing factors that may serve as
disincentives to hiring older workers).
31. See id. at 664-68. This fairly steady decrease in the retirement age may be
stabilizing, although demographers and economists who closely monitor the trends
draw varying conclusions about shifts in the employment rates. See Besl & Kale,
supra note 23, at 19.
32. See generally ERIC KINGSON, THE DIVERSITY OF THE BABY BOOM GENERATION:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THEIR RETIREMENT YEARS (1992); Besl & Kale, supra note 23;
Cornman & Kingson, supra note 1.
800 [Vol. 31:795
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individual savings plans. The possible impact of these changes
is complex. Over time, a higher percentage of the work force
will be older, and often paid more than younger employees.
This may encourage employers to consider retirement incen-
tives, particularly when many of these retirees would consider
part-time participation. On the other hand, the decreased pool
of younger workers may discourage employers from offering
incentives because the more senior workers are simply too valu-
able to the employer.
Other pressures are likely to encourage older workers to
continue working in some form. Concerns about health care
costs and allocations are likely to affect the retirement decisions
of many workers. If the employee receives health insurance
through their employer, the employee must make plans to ob-
tain insurance coverage until Medicare becomes available at age
sixty-five. Even after age sixty-five, Medicare coverage is incom-
plete and, increasingly, workers need to consider health insur-
ance availability and cost in retirement.' If affordable health
care is not available, workers will have to remain in the work
force if they are able.
The newer, older workers are also more educated than the
oldest generation, and this higher education rate may encour-
age workers to remain in the work force longer than their par-
ents.' Past retirement patterns indicate that workers with
more schooling are more likely to continue working past fifty-
five.35 By the year 2020, college graduates will outnumber high
school dropouts (the least educated group of workers) by three
to one.36 This tendency to work longer may be due, in part, to
the fact that more educated workers tend to earn higher in-
comes, which creates a financial incentive to continue
working.
37
This pattern of continued work may be more significant for
older women than older men. Since women live longer than
33. See KINGSON, supra note 32, -at 45-48.
34. See Besl & Kale, supra note 23, at 18.
35. See id. at 20.
36. See id. at 22.
37. See id. at 19.
1997] 801
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men and are participating in the work force at a greater rate
than in the past, there is a likelihood of continued participation
of women in the work force. Rising divorce rates may also af-
fect the availability of pensions, and therefore the affordability
of retirement, particularly for women.8 Changing race and
ethnic diversity in the population may also shape retirement
patterns. Currently, older black women have the highest rate of
labor force participation among workers fifty-five and older.3 9
This may reflect lower wages, which make traditional retire-
ment simply unaffordable. If wage disparities drop, the effect of
race on the work participation rate of older workers may
change.
Rising college costs are also reshaping how employees use
their long-term savings. As American families delay marriage
and childbirth, these workers will face significant college costs
at the very time that they would traditionally be considering
retirement.' Because families are smaller, workers also have a
smaller family network for support in retirement. 41
Taken as whole, these demographic changes are likely to
mean that a larger number of workers will be inclined to con-
tinue in the work force. Government regulation increasingly
encourages, or at least has removed many disincentives to, con-
tinued work by older people.' This is implemented through a
series of legislative changes.' The 1983 Amendments to the
Social Security Act are phasing in a variety of changes to re-
duce work disincentives. The retirement age at which a worker
will receive full benefits will slowly increase from sixty-five to
sixty-seven (to be completed by 2027)." The Amendments will
eventually phase in an increase in the early retirement penalty
and will slightly increase the delayed retirement credit given to
38. See id. at 26.
39. See id. at 24.
40. See KINGSON, supra note 32, at 9-11 (noting that the median age for a first
marriage has increased by more than three years since the mid-1950s, and that baby
boomers have postponed childbirth).
41. See id. at 11.
42. See Barry L. Friedman, Social Security Wealth and Labor Supply Incentives,
in HANDBOOK ON EMPLOYMENT AND THE ELDERLY 144 (William H. Crown ed., 1996).
43. See QUINN ET AL., supra note 20, at 193.
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(1) (1994).
802 [Vol. 31:795
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workers who continue to work after the normal retirement
age.' The 1986 amendments to the ADEA eliminated manda-
tory retirement for all but a small group of workers.' The
ADEA now also prohibits employers from reducing or eliminat-
ing pension benefit accruals because of age.'
Trends in private pension plans also are reducing
disincentives to continue working. Defined benefit plans, those
that guarantee a certain payment each month, were at one
time the most common form of pension plans.' Defined benefit
plans typically contain work disincentives by setting maximum
pension benefits and limiting the years of service that count
toward the pension. Older, long-term employees may have ac-
crued the maximum available pension after thirty years, while
still in their fiftes. Employers, however, increasingly favor
defined contribution plans,"9 in which the employer and em-
ployee contribute to the plan and the funds are invested until
the employee reaches retirement age.50 Unlike defined benefit
plans, which are often based wholly on employer contributions,
defined contribution plans rely primarily on the employee's own
contributions from pre-tax earned income, the amount of which
is based largely on the employee's farsightedness and ability to
save.5 Employees have to earn sufficient income in order to
devote some of the income to future planning. Furthermore,
this change in pension funding is occurring at the same time
that personal savings rates have declined.52 Because defined
contribution plans are based on a retirement investment ac-
count, which belongs to the employee, the employer has fewer
45. See id.; see generally Friedman, supra note 42, at 147.
46. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-592, 100 Stat. 3342 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 622-624, 630-631).
47. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(i)(1)(A) (1994); see also Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 116 S.
Ct. 1783 (1996) (holding that ERISA does not prohibit conditioning payment of in-
creased pension benefits on retiree's release of employment-related claims, and that
amendments to ERISA and ADEA that prohibit age-based cessation or reduction of
benefit accruals do not apply retroactively).
48. See John A. Turner & Tabitha Doescher, Pensions and Retirement, in HAND-
BOOK ON EMPLOYMNT AND THE ELDERLY 165, 180 (William H. Crown ed., 1996).
49. See QUINN ET AL, supra note 20, at 247.
50. See Mitchell & Rappaport, supra note 18, at 56.
51. See id. at 57.
52. See Besl & Kale, supra note 23, at 18.
1997] 803
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
opportunities to make changes in the retirement account that
are likely to encourage retirement. 3 Early retirement subsidies
and postretirement benefit increases are usually not possible
under defined contribution plans."
These changing social forces and retirement patterns will
inevitably affect how employers use retirement incentives. Larg-
er economic forces are likely to encourage workers to continue
work. The drop in the number of defined benefit plans reduces
the employer's ability to use standard pension plan changes as
a way to encourage retirement. Yet some employers may still
consider replacing full-time career employees with part-time
and lower cost employees (including other semi-retirees). All of
these factors are likely to increase the role of retirement incen-
tives as one of the few vehicles for employers to control the
number of older workers in their work force.
Against this backdrop of changing retirement patterns, we
have seen a move toward unmonitored employer control of
retirement incentives under ADEA. Two important develop-
ments have pushed this trend forward: the affirmation of waiv-
ers under the ADEA for retirement and exit incentives (coupled
with changes in the law that increase plaintiffs burden in es-
tablishing an ADEA case), and the rise of arbitration and other
forms of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) as forums for
resolving legal challenges to retirement incentives. These chang-
es have made it harder to assess the legal impact of the
employer's conduct. They shield much of the employer's activi-
ties from close legal scrutiny. Consequently, we need to exam-
ine these developments closely.
III. THE MOVEMENT TOWARD UNMONITORED EMPLOYER
CONTROL OF RETIREMENT INCENTIVES
A. Retirement Incentives and Exit Programs: Waiver & Choice
As retirement incentive programs became popular in the
1980s, employers increasingly used waivers or releases from
53. See Turner & Doescher, supra note 48, at 180.
54. See Mitchell & Rappaport, supra note 18, at 60.
[Vol. 31:795804
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liability as a condition to granting the additional benefits.55
While waivers and releases were initially challenged under the
ADEA, courts generally rejected an absolute prohibition of waiv-
ers and releases, as long as they were knowing and volun-
tary.56 The standards used to evaluate voluntariness varied
among the courts, however, and the 1990 amendments to the
ADEA, through the Older Worker Benefit Protection Act
(OWBPA), expressly addressed the conditions under which re-
leases are valid under the ADEA. 57
To better understand waivers, it is helpful to identify com-
mon plan designs and methods of implementation. Retirement
and exit incentives can be designed in several ways. Sometimes
the incentive is structured as an exit incentive that is not ex-
pressly tied to retirement. For example, an employer may offer
a lump sum payment, a payment based on years of service
($1000 for each year of employment), or a percentage of salary,
which may or may not be tied to retirement.'e Some incentives
are structured as pure retirement incentives, offering enhanced
pension-related benefits to employees near retirement age, such
as adding years of service to the pension formula or providing
insurance benefits until the employee is eligible for Medicare. 9
Both systems are likely to impact employees in the protected
class.
These retirement and exit incentives can occur via individual
or group offers. In the first form, an employer may individually
negotiate with a single employee to give the employee financial
incentives in return for the employee's resignation. The OWBPA
sets out seven criteria for a valid waiver between an individual
55. See S. REP. No. 101-263, at 26-27, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C--N. 1532
(Since the 1978 amendments to the ADEA, there has been a dramatic rise in the
number of early retirement incentive programs used by employers."); 1 HOWARD C.
EGLIT, AGE DISCRMINATION § 5.63 (2d ed. 1994).
56. See EGLIT, supra note 55, § 5.64.
57. See generally OWBPA, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-626 (1990 & Supp. 1996)). The OWBPA uses the term
release, but for purposes of this discussion release is fumetionally the same as a waiv-
er. Both function to preclude the employee from pursuing legal action against the
employer under the ADEA because of a contractual agreement.
58. See S. REP. No. 101-263, 27-28 at (describing these programs as lawful early
retirement incentives).
59. See Harper, supra note 8.
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employee and the employer: (1) the waiver must be in under-
standable language; (2) the waiver must specifically refer to
ADEA rights and claims; (3) the waiver cannot include claims
after the date of the document (i.e., no prospective waiver); (4)
the waiver must include consideration; (5) the employee must
be advised in writing to consult an attorney; (6) the employee
must be given twenty-one days to consider the offer; and, (7)
the employee must be given a seven-day revocation period.60
Since this involves, at least in theory, a one-on-one negotiation,
the OWBPA does not require the employer to provide data
about what other employees might have received. Sometimes
the employer and employee engage in meaningful negotiations.
In other circumstances, the employer has a standard offer that
generally does not vary.
These seven criteria demonstrate that Congress views incen-
tives and waivers as a contract, which must conform to stan-
dard contract provisions. Congress did elect to give some addi-
tional protections, such as time to consider the offer and a
revocation period.6' While a positive step, these protections
only put retirement incentives on a par with purchasing a time-
share in many jurisdictions.62
In many instances employers do not engage in individual
negotiations, but instead offer an incentive package to a group
of employees. Group retirement and exit incentives have become
very popular in recent years as a method of implementing the
euphemistic "downsizing." If a waiver is offered as part of a
group program, the OWBPA requires employers to disclose the
program's eligibility criteria, time limits, the job titles and ages
of individuals eligible or selected for the program, and the ages
of all individuals in the same job class or unit who are not
eligible or selected.63 The OWBPA also requires that employers
provide the employees forty-five days to consider the agree-
60. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1) (Supp. 1996).
61. See, e.g., Mary Lou Savage, et al., Time Share Regulation: The Wisconsin
Model, 77 MARQ. L. REv. 719, 740 (1994) (discussing regulation of selling practices,
including a five-day revocation period).
62. See id.
63. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(H) (1994).
806 [Vol. 31:795
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ment.' In theory, this additional information about eligibility
criteria and similarly situated employees gives the offeree an
opportunity to determine both whether he or she is being treat-
ed fairly vis-a-vis the larger group, and whether the group offer
has a discriminatory impact.
These waiver/release provisions evolved from the laudable
goal of clarifying the legal standard for evaluating waivers and
preventing abuses in providing retirement incentives. But set-
ting out waiver provisions in detail also establishes a clear road
map to employers. To minimize liability, a risk-adverse employ-
er will establish a form waiver. If an employer complies with
the minimum requirements of the ADEA by following this road
map, the employer is likely to be free of liability once the em-
ployee signs the waiver and the revocation period has passed."
While predictability is a very positive value in most circum-
stances, here we are not predicting lawful behavior, but only
freedom from liability. Employers could put together incentives
that otherwise would violate the ADEA, but offer attractive
payments or buyouts under the shadow of layoffs. Risk-adverse
employees are likely to take the offer. The employer's underly-
ing conduct is shielded from public review.
In addition, while the terms of the agreement and the waiver
might be subject to "negotiation," realistically that negotiation
is only open to the more highly compensated employees. Again,
if an employer complies with the OWBPA, courts are much less
likely to conclude that the waiver was involuntary. The chal-
lenges to the employer's plans will be likely dismissed at sum-
mary judgment based on the employee's waiver.
64. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(F)(ii) (1994).
65. See, e.g., Blakeney v. Lomas Info. Sys., 65 F.3d 482, 484 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 116 S. Ct. 1042 (1996) (holding that a waiver is knowing and voluntary if it
complies with statutory requirements of OWBPA; employer's failure to comply with
OWBPA creates voidable contract that is ratified by employee's retention of severance
pay); Hodge v. New York College, 940 F. Supp. 579, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). But see
Anderson v. Lifeco Serv. Corp., 881 F. Supp. 1500, 1503-04 (D. Col. 1995) (finding
that a release conformed to the minimum requirements of § 626(f) and also satisfied
the additional requirement that it was knowing and voluntary, because of employee's
constructive and perhaps actual knowledge, and because of negotiation with employ-
er).
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For group offers, the waiver provisions try to provide employ-
ees with information that might allow a knowledgeable attorney
to determine if a prima facie case of age discrimination is pres-
ent by the choice of who is offered the plan. This information is
largely form over substance. Employers are understandably
heartened-and employees dismayed-by the increasingly high
standard for proving intentional discrimination under federal
non-discrimination statutes, including the ADEA 66 An employ-
ee who sees a pattern of disparate impact on older workers also
has an increasingly thin legal theory that can only be pursued
at significant legal risk.6' Given the current legal climate, an
employee faces an extraordinarily hard choice in giving up a
sum certain for proceeding in an increasingly skeptical judicial
forum. In addition, the decision to retire is traumatic and many
employees will simply go with the path of least resistance be-
cause they cannot focus on making a major life choice in twen-
ty-one to forty-five days. These concerns cause some commenta-
tors to argue that the waiver provisions function more like a
prospective waiver than a settlement of claims."
Mr. Spink's experience is illustrative.69 Mr. Spink was reem-
ployed by Lockheed Corporation in 1979. He declined a retire-
ment incentive offer, and refused to sign a waiver because the
company made clear that he and similarly situated employees
would not receive pension credit for their earlier service. Mr.
Spink sued. The Supreme Court agreed with the employer that
the 1986 changes in the law that prohibited age discrimination
in benefit accruals did not apply retroactively." Mr. Spink had
66. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 615 (1993) (firing an employee
to prevent vesting in a pension plan, although illegal under ERISA, is not alone a
violation of the ADEA); Mark S. Brodin, The Demise of Circumstantial Proof in Em-
ployment Discrimination Litigation: St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, Pretext, and the
"Personality" Excuse, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. (forthcoming July 1997); Roger
J. Johns, Jr., Proving Pretext and Willfulness in Age Discrimination Cases after Hazen
Paper Company v. Biggens, 45 LAB. L. J. 221 (1994).
67. See Hazen, 507 U.S. at 611; Mack A. Player, Wards Cove Packing or Not
Wards Cove Packing? That is Not the Question: Some Thoughts on Impact Analysis
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 819 (1997).
68. See, e.g., Harper, supra note 8.
69. See Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 116 S. Ct. 1783 (1996).
70. See id. at 1786. ERISA does not prohibit conditioning payment of increased
pension benefits on retiree's release of employment-related claims. See id. at 1787.
The amendments to ERISA and ADEA that prohibit age-based cessation or reduction
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to incur considerable financial risk-and he lost--just to bring
the policy issue to a public forum. If we were talking about two
corporate entities, we might feel more comfortable with allocat-
ing litigation risks in this way. But with the ADEA, we typi-
cally have an individual employee challenging a much larger
corporate entity.
Even if we dismiss these concerns as part of many hard
choices against which the law cannot guard, we still have a
system in place that functionally encourages employers to
shield plans from later public scrutiny through waivers. While
the understaffed EEOC still has the right to challenge such
plans, employees waive any compensation if a violation is
found. 1 This reduces the employee's incentive to bring the de-
tails of the plan to a public forum. In addition, many courts
have held that employees must give back the retirement incen-
tive before they are allowed to challenge it in court (the ten-
der/ratification doctrine). 2 Liberal use of waivers promises to
impede the non-discrimination goals of the ADEA.
Waivers also impede the ability of the ADEA to complement
our national retirement policies. As noted above, federal law
has removed many disincentives to continued work. As our
population ages, we will see a rise in the number of retired
workers whose Social Security must be funded in part by the
smaller number of full-time workers. Just as Social Security
will slowly increase the eligibility age for benefits, Congress
may need to take more aggressive action to encourage workers
to remain in the work force. For example, Congress could con-
clude that the stated ADEA purpose of promoting employment
of older workers based on ability is more important than allow-
ing employers to meet the problems arising from the impact of
age on employment through retirement incentives. 3 Congress
of benefit accruals do not apply retroactively. See id.
71. See, e.g., Coventry v. United States Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514, 524 (3d Cir.
1988).
72. See, e.g., Jill R. Bodensteiner, Note, Post-OWBPA Developments in the Law
Regarding Waivers to ADEA Claim, 46 WASH. U. J. URB. & CON'EMP. L. 225 (1994)
(describing history of waivers under the ADEA and developing conflict on the validity
of the tender/ratification doctrine).
73. See 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1996) (citing two of the stated purposes of the ADEA);
see also Mutschler, supra note 19, at 192-93 ("Inducing workers to leave their jobs
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may need to impose increased restrictions on retirement incen-
tives to give greater assurance that retirement is truly volun-
tary. With waivers, questionable retirement incentives are much
less likely to be reviewed in court, impeding the flow of infor-
mation about what employers are doing and how employees are
reacting to retirement incentives.
B. Dispute Resolution: Forum and Choice
A second, independent development under the ADEA promis-
es to push retirement incentives further from public scrutiny.
Over the last fifteen years, the United States Supreme Court
has enthusiastically endorsed arbitration of commercial disputes
as an alternative to traditional court-based litigation.74 The
Supreme Court's primary vehicle for encouraging arbitration
has been the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act, which has been the
subject of a series of very favorable opinions." These favorable
interpretations were confined initially to more traditional com-
mercial settings, such as the relationship between franchisees
and the arbitrability of anti-trust issues in disputes between
foreign and domestic corporations.76 Federal employment dis-
crimination claims had been viewed as beyond the scope of
mandatory arbitration in large measure due to the Supreme
Court's decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.77 In a
unanimous decision, the Court held in Alexander that the em-
ployee was entitled to trial de novo on his race discrimination
complaint under Title VII, even though he had submitted his
discharge to final arbitration under a non-discrimination clause
prior to their planned date of retirement frequently curtails individual savings or may
cause retirees to withdraw funds sooner than they had planned. Clearly, in these
instances, what is good for GM is not good for the nation.").
74. See Stephen L. Hayford, Commercial Arbitration in the Supreme Court 1983-
1995: A Sea Change, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (1996) (finding that between 1983
and 1995 the Supreme Court issued 13 opinions under the Federal Arbitration Act
strongly embracing arbitration of commercial disputes).
75. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (1994).
76. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614 (1984) (discussing the arbitration of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act between Japa-
nese and Puerto Rican corporations); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984)
(discussing the arbitration of statutory rights under the California Franchise Invest-
ment law).
77. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
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of a collective bargaining agreement. The Court expressly dis-
tinguished between contractual disputes and resolution of rights
created under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.8
The distinction between business contractual disputes and
federal statutory employment disputes was significantly eroded
in 1991 when the Supreme Court changed the operating pre-
sumption about the arbitrability of statutory employment dis-
crimination claims. In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp.," the Supreme Court concluded that the ADEA does not
prevent ADEA claims from being subject to mandatory arbitra-
tion.8" In Gilmer, the employee signed a New York Stock Ex-
change securities representative application, which contained a
clause requiring arbitration of any controversy arising out of
the employment or termination of the employment. Mr. Gilmer
was discharged at age sixty-two and filed the requisite age dis-
crimination complaint with the EEOC. The Supreme Court held
that statutory claims, such as Mr. Gilmer's ADEA claim, may
be subject to mandatory arbitration agreements under the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act.8' Only a clear intent from the ADEA to
preclude arbitration would be sufficient to overcome the strong
federal policy toward arbitration.' Gilmer drew expressly on
the line of cases in which the Court has actively supported
moving statutory causes of action into a private forum." More
importantly, the Court expressly distinguished Alexander as
reflecting a "'mistrust of the arbitral process" that has been
undermined by more recent decisions."
Alternatives to litigation, such as arbitration, have tremen-
dous virtues that are worthy of being implemented as federal
78. See id. at 56 ("Arbitral procedures, while well suited to the resolution of con-
tractual disputes, make arbitration a comparatively inappropriate forum for the final
resolution of rights created by Title VI1).
79. See id. at 35.
80. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
81. See id. at 35.
82. See id. at 26.
83. See Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1997
Sup. CT. REv. 331, 369-71 (forthcoming) (on file with author); Hayford, supra note 74,
at 29-32.
84. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 34 (quoting Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,
482 U.S. 220, 231-32 (1987)).
1997]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:795
policy.' Arbitration, in general, has simpler procedures that
are generally more accessible and understandable to employees.
Consequently, they are usually quicker and less expensive to
pursue for both employers and employees." Arbitration often
allows for more creative remedies, such as outplacement.' In
many cases employees with lower wages cannot afford counsel
to pursue statutory claims. Often the damages are so small
that lawyers are unwilling to take the case on contingency. As
the Supreme Court noted in Gilmer, the ADEA contains a pro-
vision to encourage informal resolution of disputes, which in-
volves a voluntary resolution of the claim under the auspices of
the EEOC.' We can, however, embrace these many advan-
tages of alternative dispute resolution, including mediation,
without endorsing wholesale transfer of employment disputes to
mandatory arbitration. Imposing mandatory arbitration for
statutory employment discrimination claims based on a pre-
employment agreement (or a statement in an employee hand-
book for an employee-at-will) is much more problematic than
the Supreme Court acknowledges.
As a practical matter, only the very highest-level employees
have individually negotiated employment agreements. In most
cases, employees are either handed a standard agreement (like
Mr. Gilmer as a securities representative) or are given an em-
ployment manual and told that these are the terms and condi-
tions of employment, should the employee decide to work for
the employer. In the employment context, the mandatory arbi-
tration clauses often look like a contract of adhesion. We do not
call them such because the Supreme Court has viewed arbitra-
tion over the last fifteen years as a content-neutral act. The
Court gave lip service in Gilmer to the notion that an agree-
ment to arbitrate might have "resulted from the sort of fraud or
overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds" for
a contract revocation. 9 But agreements that involve mere un-
85. See generally Andrew W. McThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation,
94 YALE L.J. 1660 (1985).
86. See Stephen W. Skrainka, The Utility of Arbitration Agreements in Employ-
ment Manuals and Collective Bargaining Agreements for Resolving Civil Rights, Age
and ADA Claims, 37 ST. Louis U. L.J. 985, 992-93 (1993).
87. See id. at 991.
88. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 29.
89. Id. at 33 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
812
RETIREMENT INCENTIVES
equal bargaining power were not seen as problematic and the
Court essentially placed the take-it-or-leave-it agreements be-
tween employers and employees "on the same footing as other
contracts."0
In addition, unlike labor or large commercial arbitration, the
employer is likely to be the dominant repeat player and the
employee a one-time participant in arbitration. This lends itself,
at least in theory, to a hidden preference for the interests of
the repeat players, who will have the ability to hire the arbitra-
tor again.9 Unfortunately, unlike the courts, there is no cen-
tralized repository of data that allows us to monitor the number
of cases going to employment arbitration, although it appears
that the numbers are still quite small.92 But preliminary stud-
ies of the available data show interesting patterns emerging. It
appears that employees who bring claims typical of executive-
level managers (e.g., breach of express contract) fare well in
arbitration and win even more often than employers. The small
sampling to date makes it unclear whether lower-level, non-
executive employees fare as well in arbitration. These are typi-
cally the employees most in need of a strong forum to help
equalize the power relationship between employers and employ-
ees. It is too soon to make adverse judgments, however, since
these non-executive workers are the same employees who tend
to fare poorly in traditional litigation as well." But the con-
cern for repeat player preference in arbitration is very much a
live issue.
The ADEA, and other statutory claims, also contain express
authorization for suit in federal court. This implicitly gives
473 U.S. 614, 627 (1984)).
90. Id. at 33 (noting there was no indication that Gilmer, "an experienced busi-
nessman, was coerced or defrauded into agreeing to the arbitration clause .... This
claim of unequal bargaining power is best left for resolution in specific cases.").
91. See Lisa B. Bingham, Emerging Due Process Concerns in Employment Arbitra-
tion: A Look at Actual Cases, 47 LAB. L.J. 108 (1996) (discussing empirical study of
employment cases arbitrated by the American Arbitration Association in 1993, com-
paring outcomes under the older commercial rules and the new Employment Dispute
Resolution Rules).
92. See id. at 112-13.
93. See id. at 115-16.
94. See Skrainka, supra note 86, at 998-99.
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litigants the ability to use the procedural powers of the courts
to develop evidence. In contrast, the Federal Arbitration Act
does not contain clear provisions for discovery (beyond subpoena
power), or for judicial review of the substantive interpretation
of employment discrimination law.95 The very attributes that
tend to make arbitration quicker and cheaper (fewer procedural
rules, less discovery, lower evidentiary standards) also open the
door for procedural abuses.9" Consistent with its other arbitra-
tion opinions, the Supreme Court in Gilmer rejected challenges
to procedural differences between the court and arbitral forums
as a basis for precluding arbitration.97 The Court was unclear
what minimum standards for fairness would be required for a
valid arbitration.
Not only did the original ADEA not anticipate wholesale
mandatory arbitration based often on unnegotiated take-it-or-
leave-it employer requirements, the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) was not passed with statutory employment discrimina-
tion claims in mind. The FAA was passed in 1925 and could
not have anticipated arbitrators interpreting a vast array of
statutory employment discrimination law and sets up no train-
ing criteria for doing so. Even more troublesome, the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the FAA has essentially pre-empted
the ability of most state law to equalize the bargaining power
between the parties.98
Gilmer does not provide strong or clear legal constraints on
what employers can incorporate into their alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) procedures, such as limiting discovery, limiting
the time for bringing an arbitration request, and limiting the
use of counsel. Courts may impose some limits in extreme cas-
es,"9 but given the strong policy toward arbitration, there is no
95. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (1994); see also Carrington & Haagen, supra note 83, at
347.
96. See Ronald Turner, Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination
Claims With Special Reference to the Three A's-Access, Adjudication, and Acceptabili-
ty, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 231, 235-36 (1996).
97. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30-32 (1991).
98. See Carrington & Haagen, supra note 83, at 379-91.
99. See, e.g., Heurtebise v. Reliable Bus. Computers, 550 N.W.2d 243, 247 (Mich.
1996) (holding employee handbook did not create enforceable arbitration agreement for
employee's gender discrimination claim because employer did not intend to be bound
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assurance that courts will impose significant procedural require-
ments on arbitration.'ce
In the absence of meaningful public guidance, some of the
ADR and labor groups in the private sector have begun to ad-
dress the unfairness inherent in the employer control over the
arbitration process. Representatives of several of the major
ADR providers (American Arbitration Association, Endispute,
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, Society of Profes-
sionals in Dispute Resolution, National Academy of Arbitrators)
and others with an interest in employer-employee relations
(ABA, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, ACLU,
National Employment Lawyers Association) created a Task
Force which developed a "Due Process Protocol" as a guideline
for fair employment arbitration proceedings.''
The Task Force disagreed on many policy issues concerning
the timing of an agreement to mediate and/or arbitrate a stat-
utory dispute. They did agree on several important procedural
issues. Employees should have the right to be represented by a
spokesperson of their own choosing, and they should have ac-
cess to all information reasonably relevant to mediation or
arbitration of their claims.0 2 Mediators and arbitrators should
have the skills to conduct the hearings and a knowledge of the
statutory issues; they should be impartial, preferably selected
from a roster determined on a non-discriminatory basis.' 3 The
mediator or arbitrator "has a duty to disclose any relationship
which might reasonably constitute or be perceived as a conflict
of interest."' 4 Perhaps most importantly, the mediators and
arbitrators "should reject cases if they believe the procedures
lack requisite due process."' 5 Consistent with this Due Pro-
by any provision in handbook).
100. See, e.g., Continental Airlines v. Mason, No. 95-55343, 1996 WL 341758 (9th
Cir. June 19, 1996) (compelling arbitration under employee handbook of sex discrimi-
nation, wrongful termination, and infliction of emotional distress claims; an arbitra-
tion procedure that does not provide for discovery or legal counsel is not uncon-
scionable).
101. See Bingham, supra note 91, app. at 122.
102. Id.
103. See id. at 123-24.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 124.
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cess Protocol, the American Arbitration Association has created
National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes. It is
too soon to tell if this private effort to implement fairness will
curb potential abuses.
Only a handful of reported cases have emerged since Gilmer,
but there is reason to believe that employers will slowly move
toward increasing their use of arbitration for ADEA and other
statutory employment discrimination claims. Gilmer coincides
with a strong private employer movement toward alternative
dispute resolution. Employers are increasingly looking toward
in-house dispute resolution schemes that will head off employee
conflicts long before they reach court. Early intervention
through ADR is a positive development. Companies often im-
plement a tiered system based on discussing complaints, using
hot-lines, or conducting peer reviews to identify and resolve
disputes before they become a cause celebre. At the next level,
an in-house or outside mediator assists the parties in crafting a
mutually acceptable resolution. If these in-house and voluntary
schemes fail, employers turn to arbitration (whether binding or
non-binding) to hear each side and make findings."° This last
stage leaves open the strongest possibility of unreviewable
harm to aggrieved employees.
The movement toward arbitration of statutory employment
disputes, such as ADEA claims, may impair the non-discrimi-
nation goals of the statutes. For all the reasons noted above, it
is questionable whether arbitration will be a better forum for
achieving the public policy of eliminating age discrimination.
That concern is compounded in the area of waivers. Given the
strong congressional imprimatur of waivers with retirement
incentives, it is a small step to conclude that waiver provisions
will eventually contain standard arbitration clauses for inter-
preting the waiver agreement. Any cases that are not covered
by the waiver contract could be covered by an employee manual
or individual employment contract requiring arbitration. In-
creasing reliance on waivers and arbitration is likely to push
106. See generally Edward Baig, When It's Time to Do Battle With Your Company,
Bus. WY,, Feb. 10, 1997, at 130-31.
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many legal challenges to retirement incentives behind closed
doors.
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF MOVING RETIREMENT INCENTIVES
BEHIND CLOSED DOORS
The increasing use of waivers and the development of man-
datory arbitration of ADEA claims diminish scrutiny of age
discrimination complaints, particularly in the area of retirement
incentives. Statutes that provide private rights of action give
aggrieved individuals the power to choose whether to enforce
their perceived rights. Like a private attorney general, the law
is using those individuals (and giving them incentives) to imple-
ment public policy. Allowing private rights of action supple-
ments the underfunded enforcement efforts by the EEOC. That
shared responsibility is a very rational system of coordinated
enforcement that gives those with the most incentive (the
harmed individual) the power to challenge the employer's deci-
sion." But empowering employers to set the conditions for
resolving statutory employment discrimination disputes, rather
than regulating that power, is ripe with abuse. To call upon an
old bromide, the fox is now guarding the chicken coop.
Gilmer argues that arbitration can further important social
policies through its remedial and deterrent functions.1" Even
assuming that is true, it is less clear whether a "double choice"
model of privatizing disputes through waiver of both claims and
forums, as allowed with retirement incentives, can promote the
ADEA's social policies in this context. If embraced by many
employers, there will be little deterrence left because we will
have far fewer enforceable legal limitations to retirement incen-
tives.
Both waivers of the right to sue for retirement incentives and
of the right to go to court (substituted by mandatory arbitra-
tion) are superficially the result of "choice." Many eloquent
commentators have noted the bright and dark sides of choice.
107. See Judith A. McMorrow, Who Owns Rights: Waiving and Settling Private
Rights of Action, 34 VILL. L. REV. 429-50 (1989).
108. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27-28 (1991).
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One highly problematic aspect of choice is that it selects a
status quo as a starting point. This has significant practical
implications and subtle sociological consequences. Both releases
and arbitration clauses are typically offered on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis by employers. There is seldom equality of bar-
gaining power. While this may strike some as less troublesome
in the waiver context, where employers are offering a consider-
ation that they need not provide, there is typically no consider-
ation for arbitration clauses. There is seldom meaningful negoti-
ation for employees who receive lower compensation. Class
distinctions emerge. The choice model also has significant im-
plications for institutionalizing race and gender distinctions.
We should care that there is less public scrutiny of employer
retirement incentives. Although employees seem to be embrac-
ing more creative retirement options, it is unclear whether the
non-discrimination goals are fully achieved when employers can
shield their retirement incentives from public scrutiny. We also
do not know whether larger public policy concerns, such as
encouraging older workers to continue in the work force to
create an appropriate balance between full-time and retired
workers, might be eroded by employers' aggressive use of re-
tirement incentives. Certainly, we will have less "percolating" of
issues in the lower courts. We will have less intermediate anal-
ysis to help us understand what constitutes fair retirement
incentives that balance the freedom of choice for employees and
employers and the larger public policy concerns. These are the
dangers of implementing public policy in private.
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